Review of Marti Kheel’s Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective by Fernflores, Rachel
  
  
 
 
237
Review of Marti Kheel’s Nature Ethics: An 

Ecofeminist Perspective
 
Rachel Fernflores 

Philosophy Department 

Women's and Gender Studies Department 

California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 

rfernflo@calpoly.edu
 
Book Review 
In Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective, Marti Kheel 
accomplishes three main tasks. First, she convincingly argues that 
while holist nature ethicists Theordore Roosevelt, Aldo Leopold, 
Homles Rolston III, and Warwick Fox have each advanced our 
thinking about how we perceive and understand nature, they 
nevertheless each fail to grasp the tacit role that masculinity plays in 
their views. Second, she explains the strategies and insights that 
feminists, in particular ecofeminists, employ to understand our 
current relationships of dominance and exploitation over nature and 
the individuals therein, and she explains the value of some of the 
insights for rethinking those relationships. Third, she provides her
own sketch of an ecofeminist holist philosophy, which she does not 
claim is complete. Instead, she seeks only to identify some of the 
basic beliefs and epistemological and moral stances of an ecofeminist 
holist. After briefly explaining some of the key issues she successfully 
raises in accomplishing each of these three tasks, I will suggest that as
ecofeminist holists proceed to articulate the details of Kheel’s 
ecofeminist holist philosophy, they would do well to develop an even 
broader holism than she suggests by gleaning insights from global 
feminist perspectives about women, class, and food production. My 
comments concerning the need for such a far reaching a holism speak
primarily to the final, seventh chapter, entitled “Ecofeminist Holist 
Philosophy,” because it is in that chapter that we begin to see the 
overall structure of Kheel’s ecofeminist holist view. I will suggest that 
by taking the step to situate ecofeminist holism within the context of 
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global feminism, the ecofeminist holist will be embracing the full 
scope and potential of her holism and its ambition. 
In chapters one to six of her book, Kheel shows that the views of 
Roosevelt, Leopold, Rolston, and Fox are all limited by male bias 
insofar as each thinker conceives of nature as valuable only in the
abstract. Thus, these thinkers display little or no interest in seeing 
individual other-than-humans animals as intrinsically valuable. By 
contrast, as Kheel argues, a key aspect of an ecofeminist holist 
account is that individuals in nature are not regarded as subordinate 
to the greater whole. In Roosevelt’s, Leopold’s, Rolston’s, and Fox’s 
views, individuals within nature, which Kheel calls “other-than-
human animals,” are not given comparable value to that of human 
animals or of nature as an abstracted whole. For instance, for 
Roosevelt and Leopold, an important way that human animals can 
find solace in nature is through the sport of hunting (Rolston’s view 
does nothing to disavow the sport of hunting as a means of 
connecting with nature). While Warwick does not put stock in the 
value of hunting as a means of connecting with nature, he 
nevertheless conceives of nature as an expansion of one’s human self.
In all three views, the individual other-than-human animal is not 
morally significant and the fundamental moral stance toward nature 
is drawn from a deep appreciation of the concept of nature. In other 
words, what each thinker projects as a way of understanding nature, 
Kheel argues, does not fundamentally depart from traditional 
epistemological frameworks that hold that rational beings transcend 
their animal natures through reason by grasping abstract notions and
using them for guidance. 
Feminists have long argued that traditional epistemological 
frameworks requiring us to hold that reason is our greatest cognitive 
tool because it allows us to conceive of abstract wholes independent 
and indeed, in spite of, individual particulars, are limited by male 
bias (there are hundreds, if not thousands, of ways feminist have 
argued for these points. Here are just a few: Held 1998, Atherton 
1993, Lloyd 1993, Jaggar 1991). For instance, as Virginia Held
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demonstrates, while the notion of the “man of reason” has evolved, it 
has nonetheless always been construed in opposition to the notion of 
the feminine. More specifically, it has always been construed as 
excluding what has been understood as feminine. There are many 
ways feminists have made these observations. One way that the 
identification of reason with maleness has been justified is through 
an analysis of the traditional understanding of the distinction 
between the roles men occupy in the public sphere and the ones 
women occupy in the private sphere. The traditional assumption is 
that in the public realm, men transcend their animal nature by 
creating government, law, philosophy, art, and they do these things 
by discovering abstract principles (moral, mathematical, etcetera), 
and using those abstractions as guides. By contrast, in the private 
realm, what women do is reproduce. Reproduction is (still) usually 
conceived of as being only a biological act that is not a conscious, 
determinate act of creativity. Instead, it is what women do by nature 
as physical beings. Consequently, women have not been thought of as
transcending their animal nature and thus, what guides them is not 
moral principles or other abstractions, but their physicality. This is 
thought to be so in spite of the obvious ways in which reproduction 
and child rearing are governed by social and cultural practices we 
create. The man of reason, then, adopts an epistemological stance 
that siphons off the emotions, the physicality of being, and feelings of 
unity with individuals in one’s surroundings and instead, attends 
only to abstract principles and constructions to find guidance (Held 
1998, 93-94 and 102-104). 
Kheel situates each of Roosevelt’s, Leopold’s, Rolston’s, and 
Fox’s view within such a traditional epistemological framework. 
Broadly speaking, these nature ethicists think that we transcend our 
animal natures by seeing ourselves as different from nature. In so 
seeing, we find ourselves alienated from nature, yet desiring 
meaningful connections with nature. We act on the desire for 
connection through domination, control, and violence. By analogy, 
feminists have argued that we can understand male dominance over 
women, expressed through violence, by the simultaneous 
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unconscious alienation from women and accompanying desire for 
deep connections with other fellow human beings. The 
epistemological move is the same in each case: distance, abstract, 
control, dominate. 
As Kheel shows, the ecofeminist is a nature ethicist of a different 
ilk than nature ethicists who develop their views within the 
constraints of traditional male-centered epistemological frameworks. 
Ecofeminists explore intersections between dominance and 
exploitation of nature and dominance and exploitation of oppressed 
people, particularly women. While Kheel does not claim to speak for 
all ecofeminists, she does identify several components that any 
ecofeminist view will contain. I will refrain from a detailed account of 
all of the component beliefs and practices Kheel sets out in her 
analysis and instead, only mention the most significant components. 
An ecofeminist philosophy, according to Kheel, will have a 
central place for the moral significance of empathy, care, and the 
priority of individuals over the abstract. As she demonstrates, many 
ecofeminists find aspects of Carol Gilligan’s “ethic of care” approach 
to moral decision making useful for exploring alternative 
epistemological and moral stances we can take toward nature and 
individuals therein. In taking an ethic of care approach to moral 
decision making, one considers ways of preserving relations and 
maintaining connections between those affected by various moral 
resolutions, as opposed to the more traditional “ethic of justice” 
approach, which involves ascertaining which moral abstract 
principles are relevant to any given moral situation and then applying 
them on the basis of purported rational and objective criteria. In 
addition, Kheel points out that Simone Weil’s conception of 
“attentive love,” particularly in its more secular form as conceived by
Iris Murdoch, is similarly promising for many ecofeminists. Attentive
love involves developing our ability to attend to the other in a way 
that involves seeing the other through empathetic eyes. Kheel 
accurately explains the wide range of ways that feminists have been 
(rightly or wrongly) critical of the “ethic of care” approach, as well as 
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Gilligan’s own methodology and views, but contends that in spite of 
these criticisms, the ethic of care approach to figuring out what is 
morally relevant holds much promise, just as the notion of attentive 
love can be useful for stressing the importance of being conscious 
about where we direct our attention and how our agency is shaped by 
those directions. What is important, Kheel argues, is that the 
conception of care one uses is a conception of what she calls 
“contextualized care.” Contextualized care allows for respectful and 
empathetic attention to the quality of life of every individual with the 
conscious intent not to exploit or otherwise harm or sacrifice any 
individual. 
Kheel does much more in her book than I have outlined and 
what she does, she does well. Among the attitudes and practices 
Kheel argues fall out of an ecofeminist holist account is a 
commitment to veganism (or at the very least, vegetarianism). Rather
than develop a rational argument that might encourage others to 
adopt a vegan diet, she chooses instead to “reverse the onus of 
justification, asking those who consume animals and their products 
to explain the rational foundation of their dietary choice” (Kheel 
2008, 235). In other words, she is less interested in making a rational
argument that we should care and more interested in asking why we
do not care. Her approach is laudable, not just because the vegan 
obviously makes a dietary choice that allows for less suffering than 
the human carnivore. It is also strategically laudable, because 
attempting to construct a rational argument that we should care and 
respect individuals, not just the abstract whole of nature, would be 
something of a distraction and possibly even a departure from her 
view concerning the value of contextualized care in ecofeminist 
holism. The notion of contextualized care does not obviously admit of
a rational justification, if what one would hope for from such an 
account is that we would feel compelled to care as a result of seeing 
the rational abstractions developed. As Kant points out, “love as an
inclination cannot be commanded” (Kant 1993, 12). It is doubtful that
we can command or “show,” from reason and rational 
argumentation, that we should be empathetic toward others or even 
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caringly attentive because of their intrinsic value or their potential for
suffering. Empathic and emotional attention toward others can come 
about when we choose to attend to seeing the intrinsic value of 
individual others, but it is not obvious we can argue ourselves or
others into being empathetic and emotively attentive toward others 
on the basis of rational abstractions. We can develop “recognition” 
respect for others on the basis of rational abstractions that say that at 
least a human animal is worthy of respect in virtue of his or her 
humanity upon recognition of that humanity, but this is a different 
form of respect from appraising them as excellent in some way
(Dillon 1995, 292-293), and it is not to say that they are worthy of 
attitudes of empathy and care. 
In her account, Kheel faces a classic feminist challenge, namely 
that it is extremely difficult to land on a reason-based argument for 
the importance of feeling empathy and care toward other individuals, 
especially in the face of a historical and traditional stance toward 
them that denies their worth as individuals. In the particular case of 
veganism, we can point to objective facts about ways in which the diet
may improve overall health and extend individual lives, but those 
salient points speak to our desire to be happy and most of us assume, 
by reflex, that our chances of being happy are tied to being healthy 
and alive. Pointing to an individual’s health and long life as a result of
a plant based diet is not the same as making a rational case for the 
importance of empathy and care toward all living creatures. In 
reversing the burden of justification, Kheel not only avoids the 
difficulty of making a reason-based case for the value of empathy and 
care, she chooses to highlight some of the abhorrent ways that other-
than-human animals are treated for the purpose of human 
consumption. In so doing, she makes it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, for someone who desires to think of herself as having a 
compassionate, empathetic, and caring perspective, to justify eating 
animals and consuming their products once she knows the extent of 
the exploitation to which they are subjected. 
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I agree with Kheel that it is incumbent upon the ecofeminist 
holist, who views nature as a whole as valuable, but more 
importantly, all individuals, human and other-than-human animals, 
as morally significant, to adopt a life of veganism. It is unclear from 
her discussion of ecofeminism, veganism, and vegetarianism, 
whether Kheel’s view is that the only consistent ecofeminist holist is a 
vegan. However, only veganism, as Kheel sets it out, can preclude the 
immoral treatment of other-than-human animals altogether, since 
vegetarianism likely does not do so for obvious reasons concerning 
the production of, say, dairy products. Veganism is the only fully 
consistent and credible position the ecofeminist holist can hold. 
Indeed, it feels in the text that Kheel thinks that veganism is the clear 
choice, even if she often talks about “vegetarianism or veganism” in
her notion of “contextualized care,” which again, is the careful, 
conscientious and conscious care she argues we need to cultivate in 
order to have a relationship with nature and individuals therein that 
is consistent with ecofeminist holism. Nevertheless, Kheel is clearly 
correct to argue that both the vegan and the vegetarian are living lives 
that are likely to be healthier and more caring of all individuals, and 
that these are choices that fall naturally out of identifying oneself as 
an ecofeminist. 
Kheel addresses many criticisms of animal advocacy and 
veganism in her final chapter that come from a wide variety of 
sources. It is in her responses to two of those criticisms that I believe 
Kheel fails to explore how much more holist her account could be.
The first concerns the criticism of animal advocates that they spend 
time and energy on other-than-human animals, not human beings. 
Kheel points out that caring can extend to a wide range of beings, 
including plants and human beings (Kheel 2008, 239). I agree with 
Kheel on this point. However, I would encourage her to fill in her 
sketch of an ecofeminist holist philosophy with careful attention to 
the importance of rejecting participation in the exploitation of all 
individuals. The vegan makes meaningful and conscious dietary 
choices, but she needs to be careful about the risk of false 
consciousness and possibly self-righteousness. In developed and 
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under-developed parts of the world there is a great deal of 
exploitation of human animals in the production of fruit, vegetables, 
and grains. There is also significant damage done to the environment 
for the purpose of such food production. It is incumbent upon an 
ecofeminist holist to develop a holism that refuses to participate in a 
system that sees any living creatures as insignificant. This means that
beyond setting out the treatment of other-than-human animals to 
turn them into food, the ecofeminist holist needs to encourage the 
development of a robust and deep understanding of how food 
production works in the local and global context with a mind to 
underscoring how many individuals, other-than-human and human, 
are sacrificed, for the benefit of mostly the middle and upper class of 
Western industrialized nations. For instance, Ellen O’Loughlin’s 
ecofeminist analysis of the United Farm Workers grape boycott in the
late1980’s-mid 1990’s still stands as a shining example of ways we 
can think ecologically about food and women, and why we should 
think about these connections (O’Loughlin 1994, 680-688). 
One way the ecofeminist holist can become more holist in her 
approach is by including support for insights from global feminists, 
many of whom have argued that the feminization of poverty is 
unacceptable. Men, women, and children work in deplorable 
conditions for the sake of food production, either directly or 
indirectly, across the globe. However, as feminists have argued, it is 
women and often, children, in the global context who bear the brunt 
of poor working conditions and poverty. As Victoria Davion 
discusses, approximately seventy percent of the world’s human 
population work in the production of food and most of those are 
impoverished women who work to produce unsafe food in unsafe 
conditions (Davion 2008, 81-94). Susan Shaw and Janet Lee explain 
that globally, women constitute fifty-one percent of the agricultural 
labor force, yet only fifteen percent of the world’s agricultural 
extension agents are women (Shaw and Lee 2008, 431). On average, 
in the global context, women work longer hours than men in the 
cultivation of agricultural products, but few female farmers own land 
or the means of production (Shaw and Lee 2008, 431-432). 
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Ecofeminist holists who find promise in the ethic of care approach, as
Kheel does, can refine the ethic of care approach by applying it in the 
global context, as Virginia Held does (Held 2008, 43-57; Held 2006). 
In addition, the ecofeminist holist can respond to charges of neglect 
of human individual sacrifices for the sake of food production by 
extending her support to global feminists who advocate for 
rethinking principle-based respect for the sovereignty of nation states
in the interest of breaking down cultural barriers to equality and 
dignity for all (e.g., Dietz 1998, 378-400). Such a vision, while at first 
overwhelming, could nevertheless go a great distance toward a 
holism that is fully diverse and inclusive. The ecofeminist holist need 
not turn all of her attention to these other causes, but instead, she can
seek insight from others whose attention is directed toward such 
causes and possibly even find allies in others who seek to take an 
ecofeminist holist approach to life. There is room in Kheel’s view for 
global feminism, and an ecofeminist holist philosophy cannot afford 
to underestimate just how ambitious and expansive her holism needs 
to be. 
Expanding the scope of the ecofeminist holist philosophy to 
include a greater acknowledgement of the exploitation of other-than-
human and human animals by drawing insight from global feminism 
will address a second criticism of vegetarianism Kheel mentions. 
Vegans are sometimes accused of being insensitive toward the dietary 
traditions of other cultures. They are also susceptible to the 
accusation of elitism. In response, Kheel argues that vegetarianism is 
a tradition of many cultures, such as some Hindu and Buddhist 
cultures, and consequently, it is as legitimate as any other cultural 
dietary tradition (Kheel, 2008: 236). Kheel is correct that the vegan 
in fact harms fewer creatures due to her dietary choices, and for this 
the vegan is to be applauded. However, if the vegan makes these 
choices in the interest of ecofeminist holism, she needs to take the 
issues of tradition and elitism head on, so that she can explain in 
much greater detail the commitments and consequences of 
ecofeminist holism. Veganism, in the developed world, is simply not 
on a par with traditional vegetarian Hindu and Buddhist cultures, 
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even if the motivation behind the dietary choice, namely to embody 
“the ideal of nonviolence” is often the same. Usually, to be a healthy 
vegan in the developed world, one must not only participate in a local
and global system that allows for, indeed depends on, the exploitation
of human animals in the productions of food, one also needs to have 
certain advantages. A healthy vegan in the developed world is in 
possession of a considerable amount of knowledge. It takes time and 
money to accrue the kind of culinary and health awareness the 
healthy vegan enjoys. A vegan who eats only organic food, thereby 
decreasing her participation in a system that damages the 
environment and reducing her carbon footprint, is also to be 
applauded. Yet, again, it is important to observe that only someone 
with considerable resources can make such a choice. It is not just that
organic food is expensive, but also, a balanced diet of vegan food 
takes more time and knowledge to prepare when compared to the 
many processed, inexpensive non-vegan and non-vegetarian foods 
readily available. As we move to the global context, the situation is 
even more dire, since most people who live in poverty are going to eat
not just what is traditional, but whatever is around, with little or no 
knowledge of how it has been produced or whether it is healthy for
them. The ecofeminist holist is uniquely positioned to take the lead 
against the objections concerning tradition and elitism by arguing 
that we should set up our societies so that everyone is in a position to 
make the dietary choice that the ecofeminist holist vegan makes. In 
so arguing, she must argue for the value of widespread dietary and 
culinary education, as well as for greater opportunity of social 
mobility for underprivileged groups. 
Kheel wrote an excellent book, but it is in need of a sequel, one 
that spells out in far greater detail the scope of an ecofeminist holism.
She has identified male bias in prominent approaches to nature 
ethics and has clearly articulated why taking a care approach to 
nature ethics, along with an ecofeminist approach, means that the 
ecofeminist holist needs to embrace a life that involves causing as 
little harm and disruption as possible to the well being and 
flourishing of individual human and other-than-human animals.
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However, I believe the ecofeminist holist needs to think as big as the 
word “holist” allows, and this means that she needs to see how 
ambitious holism really is. Kheel makes a convincing case against the 
nature ethicists she discusses and also for her view that the burden of 
providing a rationale for dietary choices should be hoisted on the 
shoulders of those who eat meat, not on the vegan (and possibly also 
the vegetarian). However, I think her ecofeminist holism can now go
on the offensive and become even more holistic by addressing the 
criticisms of veganism and vegetarianism much more directly. Such 
an offensive approach can begin by acknowledging the role that 
privilege and opportunity play in the choice of the typical vegan and 
vegetarian in the developed parts of the world, and then advocating 
for some of the reforms global feminists advance. 
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